At a time when the utility of agencies is questioned, this article synthesizes the conclusions of the main academic works. Two points seem determining. The first one is the opposition accuracy / timeliness. Trying to rate through the cycle, rating agencies are often late to change a rating, butit seems too that a low regulatory pressure can also explain such a behaviour. The second point is the opposition certification / information production, the main role of rating agencies on bond markets being to certify (or not) to uninformed investors the point of view of informed investors.Keywords: financial regulation, credit rating agencies, bond spread.JEL: G14, G33
Auteurs :Raimbourg Philippe Extrait de la revue BMI 123
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