The example of a mixed economy company has a land development fraud neglected by the literature: there is widespread fraud, little by little, the top-down by imitation and addiction, in collusion implied. Literature was more interested, in fact, illegal maneuvers in the eyes of the officer or prohibited by law. But she had not modeled the process by which fraud is formed, grows and finds an end. Based on the case of the SEM, we propose a model for the dissemination of fraud and we discuss its possible generalization, while analyzing the appropriateness of traditional measures of fight against fraud.

A growing number of investors no longer seeks mainly to earn money by running businesses, but by making transactions on property rights of companies. The purchase and resale of industrial and commercial establishments are moments where large sums of money are exchanged quickly and in which fortunes are made ​​and unmade. What are the consequences of these changes in ownership on the constant long-term development of the institutions concerned and prosperity (or decline) of their stakeholders (employees, customers, suppliers, small investors and local) ? We propose here to examine these issues from the case study of European investment in the Brazilian bioethanol.