The cross-border strategies of European banks:
Effcts on performance 2004–12 2
Jessy TROUDART, Research Teaching Fellow at IAE La Rochelle,
CEREGE La Rochelle, France
Eric LAMARQUE, Professor at IAE Paris-Sorbonne, GREGOR, France
Are the cross-border strategies of European banks effctive? Over the period from
2007 to 2012, banking systems experienced some important transformations in several
dimensions including the international expansion, especially in OECD countries. Howe-
ver, European banks further continued their trend of increased foreign bank owner-
ship between 2007 and 2012. Besides, the share of foreign banks assets in European
area remains the same before and after the crisis in 2012 (about 80 % according to the
report of the IMF in 2013). This is mainly due to the regionalization context in which
European banks operate. Therefore, this paper is motivated by an intense internatio-
nalization in the banking sector from the beginning of this century until 2012. After
fie years of consolidation of equity capital and bank stability, many banks consider
now again the opportunity to go abroad. We investigate whether the various options
for expanding overseas have a positive impact on the profis of European banks. We
analyse the results in which 42 European banks might expect expansion abroad though
subsidiaries, conducting cross-border acquisitions, or forming cross-border partner-
ships, during the period 2004–12. We fid that extending international operations
through subsidiaries could have a negative impact on profis, whereas cross-border
partnerships could improve them.
JEL Codes: G21, G34, F23, L1, L25.
Keywords: Subsidiaries, Cross-border partnerships, Cross-border acquisitions, Profis,
European banks, Geographic diversifiation.

■ CSR Performance, Dividend Payout and
Governance Mechanisms 25
Guillaume PIJOURLET, Université Clermont Auvergne, EUM, CRCGM
EA 3849, Clermont-Ferrand, France
In this article, we study whether Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance
has an inflence on dividend payout ratios. We provide evidence that high CSR fims
pay more dividends than other fims. We also fid that the positive relationship
between CSR performance and dividend payout is observed only for fims in high
investor protection countries, for fims with high insider ownership, and with high
analyst coverage. These fidings provide support for the agency view of CSR which
posits that CSR activities may be related to the managerial expropriation of share-
holders. Dividend policy seems to be a tool used to mitigate this problem. Hence, in
accordance with the “outcome model” of dividend policies, we highlight that the link
between CSR performance and dividend payout is signifiant only when internal or
external governance mechanisms are strong. This indicates that dividend policy and
governance mechanisms are complementary and not substitute mechanisms to limit
potential expropriation linked to CSR policies.
JEL Codes: G34, G35, M14.

Keywords: Agency Theory, Corporate Social Responsibility, Dividend Policy, Governance.
■ Bank Acquisitiveness and Bailouts:
Evidence on European Banks during the 2008
Financial Crisis 40
Saqib AZIZ, Rennes School of Business, Rennes, France
Jean-Jacques LILTI, Université de Rennes 1 (IGR-IAE de Rennes),
Rennes, France
Khalid EL BADRAOUI, Ibn Zohr University, ENCG – Agadir, Morocco ;
CREM - UMR CNRS 6211, Rennes, France
Theoretical prediction that banks may pursue M&A strategies to exploit too-big-to-
fail subsidies caught attention in the backdrop of 2008 fiancial crisis. Using a sample
of 1603 M&A transactions of large European banks over the period of 1990-2006, we
investigate whether and how bank acquisitiveness relate with their bailout support
during the recent fiancial crisis. Our fidings suggest towards a positive relation of
bank acquisitiveness not only with the probability of external support but also with
the level of such support. We also fid that the bailout benefiiary banks in our sample
demonstrated a signifiant restraint in their post-crisis acquisitiveness. While our fi-
dings broadly substantiate ex-post materialization of safety-net benefis for highly
acquisitive banks, terming the post-crisis restraint on acquisitive behaviour of bailout
benefiiaries as voluntary or the one imposed by regulators rests an open question.
JEL Codes: G10, G21, G24, G34.
Keywords: Bailouts, Financial Crisis, Merger and Acquisition, Too Big to Fail.
focus on...

■ Financial Sanctions in France – 2004-2016 62
Laure DE BATZ, Laboratory of Excellence for Financial Regulation
(LabEx-ReFi), University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (CES); Institute
of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University
of Prague
The French Financial Market Authority published 308 sanction decisions from its crea-
tion in 2004 until late 2016, mostly resulting in a guilty verdict (90%) associated with
fiancial fies (94%) and/or with disciplinary sanctions (30%), after long procedures
(2.7 years on average), followed potentially by appeals. Half of them were fist published
anonymized. The most frequently sanctioned market participants are listed and asset
management companies. From 2012 to 2016, 32 settlements complemented the legal
arsenal. They are by law quicker, target less severe regulatory breaches without guilt
recognition mostly by asset management fims, and result in less severe sanctions.
JEL Codes: G14, G18, K42, N24.
Keywords: Financial markets, Regulation, Fraud, Information and market effiency, History,
Listed companies, Asset management fims.