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Abstract
This paper argues that the concept of human dignity, as currently contested, offers no clear guidance to lawmakers. Within the “bioethical triangle”, human dignity has a quite different significance depending upon whether one is a utilitarian, a human rights theorist, or a dignitarian. Having rejected the possibility of an easy accommodation between these views, it is suggested that we should conceive of human dignity as a precondition for (any form of) moral community – specifically, a setting in which humans try to do the right thing and accept responsibility for their freely chosen actions. If lawmakers re-focus on human dignity in this way, they will have some important guidance in the face of a raft of emerging technologies.
Key-words:
Principle-based ethics, Fundamental rights of the persons, Legislation, Philosophical foundations, Genetic engineering, Neurosciences, Social control over science.